Why I suspect jittery Americans nearly ruined efforts to foil plot
Andy Hayman | September 8, 2009
For several months in 2006 the key suspects in the airline plot — some of whom were convicted yesterday — were under intensive surveillance.
We logged every item they bought, we sifted every piece of rubbish they threw away (at their homes or in litterbins). We filmed and listened to them; we broke into their homes and cars to plant bugs and searched their luggage when they passed through airports.
We had been concerned about this group since early 2006. They were linked to a suspicious bookshop in Forest Gate, East London, and knew one of the July 21 bombers. The inquiry was labelled Operation Overt.
When a key figure, Abdulla Ahmed Ali, returned from Pakistan in June 2006, we searched his luggage and resealed it without him noticing. Inside was a soft drink powder, Tang, and a large number of batteries; they were bombmaking components and their discovery led to a step change in the operation. Another man, Assad Sarwar, seemed to be taking on the role of quartermaster — buying clamps, drills, syringes, glue and latex gloves. We watched him dispose of empty hydrogen peroxide containers; the substance could be used to dye hair or, as in July 2005, as an essential explosives component.
We were on their tail when Ali bought a flat in Walthamstow for £138,000 cash and we “burgled” the property to wire it up for covert sound and cameras. We watched as they experimented with turning soft-drinks containers into bottle bombs, listened as they recorded martyrdom videos and heard them discuss “18 or 19”. Were they talking about numbers of targets, bombs or bombers?
We were convinced that they were planning an attack, but wanted to let the operation run so we could gather enough evidence to put before the courts and secure convictions. Even when Commander John McDowall told me that the plan was “bigger than 9/11” we felt confident that we were on top of it. MI5 agreed with us. The stakes were high and, with American cities the targets, we had to keep Washington fully briefed.
At the very highest level, the Americans wanted to be reassured that this was not going to slip through our hands. I was briefing the Home Secretary, who was briefing Tony Blair, who was briefing George Bush. So certain were we that we were in control and had the suspects under observation 24/7 that my top team and I agreed that we could each, one at a time, take a holiday.
In August 2006, after a hectic period with little respite as we pursued one terrorism investigation after another, I packed my bags and left for La Manga on a family break.
Into the suitcase, with the suntan cream and flip-flops, went a chunky secure satellite phone. I had arranged to telephone London every day at 8pm to be updated. But four days into the holiday, on August 9, we were sitting down to dinner, the cork just out of the wine bottle, when that phone rang.
The authorities in Pakistan had arrested a man called Rashid Rauf and the consequences of that were serious for our operation. Rauf, who hailed from Birmingham, was believed to be strongly linked to the senior command of al-Qaeda in Pakistan and as such was suspected as a key reference point for directing terror plots around the world. While not provable, he was also thought to be a contact for those attending terrorism training in the tribal areas. We suspected that the terrorism cell were known and linked to him.
If they got wind of his arrest it could scare the group and maybe prompt them into accelerating their planned attack — we had to get to the men in the British cell before they found out that Rauf was in custody.
We believed the Americans had demanded the arrest and we were angry we had not been informed. We were being forced to take action, to arrest a number of suspects, which normally would have required days of planning and briefing. I needed to get back to London and had a very small window in which I could travel before things went crazy at the airports. Once news of the plot was out, the airline authorities would have to introduce strict security measures to plug the loopholes that might have allowed these men to smuggle explosives on to aircraft. Fortunately, in London, the team was much calmer.
From a standing start they located and arrested a number of people we regarded as part of the cell. Two of the ringleaders were picked up as they met to discuss plans and throughout the night and the following morning officers were bursting through doors in East London and High Wycombe.
At times like this the police service is at its best: no fuss — just fast, old-fashioned police work.
But we were concerned to know why Pakistan had jumped the gun.
Fearful for the safety of American lives, the US authorities had been getting edgy, seeking reassurance that this was not going to slip through our hands. We moved from having congenial conversations to eyeball-to-eyeball confrontations.
We thought we had managed to persuade them to hold back so we could develop new opportunities and get more evidence to present to the courts. But I was never convinced that they were content with that position. In the end, I strongly suspect that they lost their nerve and had a hand in triggering the arrest in Pakistan.
The arrest hampered our evidence-gathering and placed us in Britain under intolerable pressure. I landed at Gatwick to be met on the tarmac by Sussex Police Special Branch officers. On a blue-light run into London, I changed from T-shirt and shorts into a suit.
By 5am, I was alongside Peter Clarke, head of Counter Terrorism Command, at Cobra, the Government’s emergency committee, in the secure meeting rooms underneath Whitehall. John Reid, then the Home Secretary, was chairing the meeting and, bizarrely, was wearing sunglasses because of an eye infection. It was also somewhat unnerving — you never quite knew whether or not you were under his inquisitive glare.
The atmosphere was tense. The politicians’ stress levels were rising as they saw television news pictures of irate holidaymakers waiting for delayed and cancelled flights. Back at the Yard, information was pouring in as homes and offices of the accused were being searched and phone records analysed. Specialist lawyers from the Crown Prosecution Service camped alongside investigating officers. As the evidence was being discovered they could assess its value. Each defendant’s name was on a wall chart and when a key element of evidence was established the detail would be recorded against the relevant defendant. We could watch as the case against each suspect mounted and approached the threshold for charging.
The scale of the evidence was vast, which placed huge pressure on the interviewing teams. Their job was to interrogate each defendant based on the evidence collected. We fought long hours of fatigue with endless trips to fast-food joints. We were also creeping closer to the detention limit, which had just been raised from 14 to 28 days. But the evidence came, charges followed and the process of presenting our findings to the courts had begun.
Andy Hayman was Assistant Commissioner Specialist Operations in the Metropolitan Police in 2006
